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In 1965, Congress enacted Medicare
and Medicaid to ensure that poor and
elderly Americans would not be denied
access to health care. In that year, 5.9
percent of the nation's total output was
spent on medical services. By 1992, this
share had soared to approximately 14
percent, and by the year 2000, it is pro-
jected to reach almost 19 percent.
1 The
growing fraction of the economy de-
voted to health care is one reason why
many advocate a major overhaul of the
current system.
A second is that although federal and
state governments are projected to
spend $365 billion this year providing
medical care for the poor and aged, 15
percent of the population still lacks
health coverage — a situation many
find deplorable.
2 A third criticism
stems from the fact that 91 percent of
private health insurance is handled
through employers." This has created
what is known as "job lock," or the re-
luctance of workers to change jobs or
industries because they fear losing
their medical benefits. Although it is
hard to quantify the impact of job lock
on the economy, public opinion polls
suggest that between 10 and 30 percent
of workers feel tied to their current
companies for this reason.
These problems have led to increasing
pressure on the federal government to
pass some type of health care reform
package. Congress, the administration,
and the American public are currently
debating what form this legislation
should take. Before adopting any new
system, however, we need to under-
stand the forces — both market and
government — that have shaped and
are currently shaping our approach to
health care. This Economic Commen-
tary examines these forces by looking at
the history of medical care in the United
States since the early part of the century.
• Health Care: 1913 to 1966
Many claim that the market for health
care is unlike that for most goods and
services. While this may be true, prior
to the Depression, the health care mar-
ket in the United States operated much
like any other, with customers paying
doctors and hospitals directly out of
their own pockets. The major differ-
ence between health care and other
goods and services today is insurance:
Third-party payers now contribute 78
cents of every medical dollar spent.
The U.S. health insurance industry can
trace its roots to 1929, when Baylor
Hospital began offering prepaid hospi-
tal coverage to 1,200 teachers. This
was the beginning of what later be-
came known as Blue Cross.
5 The dra-
matic growth in health insurance did
not occur until World War II, however.
By 1943, 43 Blue Cross plans were in
effect nationwide.
Blue Cross originally based its premi-
ums on the cost of insuring specific
geographic areas, with each resident
When Medicare and Medicaid were
passed in 1965, less than 6 percent of
the nation's output was devoted to
health care. Today, that figure ex-
ceeds 14 percent and is rising rapidly.
This article looks at some of the rea-
sons behind the relentless ascent in
medical costs over the last several dec-
ades and examines how government
policy has both contributed to and
tried to rein in these costs.
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a. Includes philanthropy and industrial in-plant spending for health care.
NOTE: Personal health care expenditures are equal to national health care expenditures minus outlays for public health, research, construction, and administrative costs.
SOURCE: "Trends in Health Spending: An Update" (footnote 2), table A-4, p. 52.
charged the same amount. This prac-
tice, known as the community ratings
system, was gradually superseded by
experience-rated premiums, which
were based on the expected cost of in-
suring an individual or subgroup. Thus,
payments began to depend on a per-
son's age, sex, and health status.
The advent of experience ratings was
inevitable in light of adverse selection.
Adverse selection refers to the greater
incentive under community-rated plans
for those with generally poor health or
chronic illnesses to purchase medical
insurance. Because of this selection
bias, insurers could not charge actuari-
ally fair premiums to normal healthy in-
dividuals, who were thus driven even
further out of the market. To bring
them back in, it became necessary to
move toward an experience-rated sys-
tem. Insurance companies hence started
spending resources to ascertain the risk
class of individuals, which effectively
priced some people out of the market.
The makings of our present employer-
based health insurance system began
with the passage of the individual income
tax in 1913. At that time, employees were
not taxed on company-paid fringe bene-
fits (which would come to include health
insurance). Firms, however, could deduct
the cost of these benefits from their cor-
porate income taxes.
The substantial growth in employer-
paid health insurance also occurred dur-
ing World War II. Since wages were
frozen, companies started offering lu-
crative benefit packages — including
medical insurance — to attract the best
workers. Even after wage controls were
lifted, most companies continued to
provide health benefits, probably be-
cause of their tax advantage. Recogniz-
ing the potential revenue being missed,
the Internal Revenue Service stipulated
in 1953 that employers' contributions
to individual health policies were no
longer deductible. Congress, however,
quickly reversed this ruling with the en-
actment of section 106 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
The move by insurance companies to-
ward experience ratings reinforced the
growth of employer-provided health
coverage. Experience ratings enabled
certain groups, such as large firms, to
obtain insurance at cheaper rates. This
is because a large group formed for
non-health reasons in effect forms a
"community" and minimizes the poten-
tial for adverse selection.
Unfortunately, experience ratings also
hurt some groups, particularly small em-
ployers, the unemployed, and the aged,
hi 1965, Congress and President John-
son responded by passing Medicare and
Medicaid. Medicare provides health in-
surance for the aged, while Medicaid
provides coverage for the poor.
• The Continued Growth
of Health Insurance
The dramatic impact of Medicare and
Medicaid on the nation's health care
system is illustrated in figure 1. The
percentage of medical expenses that
consumers pay out of pocket fell from
56 percent in 1960 to 22 percent in
1991, while the fraction picked up by
federal, state, and local governments
more than doubled, from 21 percent to
43 percent.
7 In other words, every
percentage-point increase in the gov-
ernment's share of medical outlays led
to an almost equal decline in direct
spending by consumers.
The expansion of third-party payments —
both government and private — has
boosted the demand for health care. A
comprehensive study by the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment, conducted
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, looked
at the effects of various cost-sharing pro-
visions of several health insurance plans.
The results showed that each percentage-
point decline in the coinsurance rate, with
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a. Adjusted for inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index.
SOURCES: "Responses to Uncompensated Care and Pub lie-Program Controls on Spending: Do Hospitals Cost Shift?" (footnote 21); Source Book of Health Insurance
Data, Health Insurance Association of America, 1992; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
an uptick in expenditures of between
o
0.1 and 0.2 percent. Although other
factors may be at work, the RAND esti-
mates alone imply that the 34 percent de-
cline in out-of-pocket spending since
1960 corresponds to a 3.4 to 6.8 percent
rise in health care outlays, or approxi-
mately $50 billion in 1994.
The growth of medical insurance has
strengthened the demand for health
care in other ways as well. Because
third parties are footing more and more
of the bill, and because doctors are fac-
ing increasingly steeper costs due to
malpractice insurance, the practice of
defensive medicine has become wide-
spread. Defensive medicine refers to
the incentive for doctors to order exces-
sive tests and procedures — which
they do not pay for — to reduce the
likelihood of being named in a malprac-
tice suit. The cost of defensive medi-
cine is estimated to be between $4 bil-
Q
lion and $25 billion per year.
• Market Initiatives to
Slow Health Care Spending
The problems associated with third-
party payments have led to attempts by
the private market to slow the growth
of health care spending. The primary
move in this direction has been the de-
velopment and growth of health mainte-
nance and preferred provider organiza-
tions (HMOs and PPOs).
1
0 Each of
these groups has attempted to control
health care costs in a number of ways.
One is by giving the health insurer
more control over the physician provid-
ing the care. Since doctors who belong
to a managed care network are gov-
erned by the same group that pays for
their services, the incentive to practice
defensive medicine is minimized. A
second way these organizations have
tried to keep a lid on costs is by stress-
ing preventative care. Most HMOs pay
for periodic physical examinations and
other routine procedures. They have
also developed other cost-controlling
techniques that have become common
restrictions for most health plans. These
include requiring patients to attain prior
approval by a primary care physician
before receiving specialized services,
and stipulating that certain surgeries be
performed on an outpatient basis.
1
1
Studies assessing the effectiveness of
managed care in cutting costs have
shown that HMOs with fully integrated
financing and delivery systems reduce
hospital usage by 20 percent. For PPOs
and more loosely structured HMOs, that
figure is between zero and 8 percent.
1
2
• Government Initiatives to
Slow Health Care Spending
Since the passage of Medicare and
Medicaid, the federal government's
health care policy can best be charac-
terized as a series of ill-fated attempts
to control costs. These reforms were
seen as necessary because the increase
in the price of health care continued to
far outstrip that of most other goods
and services.
The federal government's approach to
HMOs has been both inconsistent and
unproductive. First, the tax exclusion
for health insurance has tended to
dampen the growth of these organiza-
tions. A recent Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) study notes, "Because
workers who receive health insurance
as a fringe benefit are shielded from
much of the cost of that insurance, they
have been slow to switch to lower-cost
providers of insurance and health main-
tenance organizations .... As a result,
the rapid growth in the consumption of
medical services and in medical expen-
ditures has been able to proceed rela-
tively unchecked.,,13
Congress, however, has also passed leg-
islation aimed at encouraging the
growth of HMOs. The HMO Act of
1973, for instance, required employers
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a. Adjusted for inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index.
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, transmitted to Congress in February 1994.
offer an HMO. Moreover, it mandated
that companies contribute at least as
much to the HMO as they did to their
regular plan.
An unintended consequence of such
legislation is that it increases insurance
costs for small and medium-sized firms.
By siphoning off workers to managed
care networks, HMOs limit the number
of people covered by a company's tra-
ditional health plan. Thus, it becomes
more difficult for certain firms to reach
the critical mass necessary to enable
them to either self-insure or purchase
health insurance at a reasonable rate.14
The major provisions of the HMO Act
have since been changed. The section
requiring employers to offer an HMO
alternative was repealed in 1993, while
the provision regarding equal managed
care and traditional plan contributions
was amended in 1988 to give compa-
nies more flexibility in determining
their HMO contributions.
Nonetheless, the 1973 legislation was
successful in the sense that HMOs'
share of the private insurance market
shot up from 3 percent in 1980 to 17
percent in 1989.
1
5 The costs of such
legislation may have been high, how-
ever. The same benefits could probably
have been achieved simply by eliminat-
ing the tax subsidies for employer-
provided health insurance.
Other federal legislation aimed at reining
in health care costs include the certificate-
of-need (CON) laws, passed in 1974.
These stipulated that legislators in all
states receiving federal health dollars
(every state except Louisiana by 1980)
review and approve any planned capital
investments by local health care institu-
tions. Capital expenditures include the
expansion of existing facilities or the pur-
chase of major medical equipment.
Unfortunately, CON laws may have
had exactly the opposite effect of that
intended. Since the demand for health
care is inelastic, limiting its supply leads
to an even greater increase in prices.
Moreover, a 1991 CBO study states
that many believed "CON in most states
was applied in an erratic and politically
motivated way that was not consistent
with cost-consciousness and the or-
derly adoption of new technologies." 16
In 1986, the requirement that states
adopt CON laws in order to receive fed-
eral funding was dropped. Nonetheless,
most states have kept these laws on
their books.
• Slowing the Growth
of Medicare and Medicaid
Medicare and Medicaid costs have been
climbing even more rapidly than those
of the medical industry as a whole. For
that reason, the 1980s saw Medicare
and most state Medicaid programs shift
from a retrospective cost-based reim-
bursement method to a prospective pay-
ment system (PPS) to compensate hos-
pitals for treating patients covered by
these plans. PPS was also designed to
give hospitals more incentive to con-
trol costs by reimbursing them at a rate
independent of their actual expenses.
Before 1981, states were required to
reimburse hospitals for treating Medi-
caid patients according to Medicare's
reasonable-cost methodology. The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981 allowed states to adopt the PPS
approach, with reimbursement based
on the expenses of an "economically
and efficiently operated hospital."
1
7
By 1985,40 states were using PPS. Medi-
care shifted to the PPS approach in 1983,
with hospitals reimbursed a prespecified
amount for each patient based on diagno-
sis, treatment, and certain characteristics
of the institution providing the care.One complication of PPS was that the
revenues hospitals received for treating
Medicare and Medicaid patients were
usually less than the actual costs in-
curred. It is estimated that in 1991, only
88 percent of hospitals' total Medicare
costs were reimbursed. For Medicaid,
this share was an even lower 82 percent.
Physician reimbursement under Medi-
caid was also restricted by PPS. In 1989,
Medicaid paid doctors an average of 69
percent of Medicare rates.18
These controls have led many health care
providers to stop accepting Medicare and
Medicaid patients. A 1991 CBO study
found that 25 percent of U.S. physicians
refuse to treat Medicaid patients. For
those providing reproductive-related
services, this share rises to 45 percent.
Doctors have also reported that hospitals
discourage them from admitting Medi-
caid patients. As a result, indigent patients
are more likely to seek care in a hospital
emergency room, where treatment is
even more expensive.
Although hospitals do not get sufficient
funding from Medicaid or Medicare to
recoup their total costs, they are willing
to treat these patients if enough revenue
is received to cover their variable oper-
ating expenses. Hospital administrators
must then recover their fixed overhead
costs by adjusting the bills of private
providers and individuals paying out of
pocket. This practice is known as cost
shifting.
Cost shifting has always existed, be-
cause hospitals have traditionally
provided a certain amount of uncom-
pensated care (charity cases plus bad
debts). The practice became even more
prevalent during the 1980s as Medicare
and Medicaid began picking up less and
less of their "full share." Figure 2 dem-
onstrates that since at least 1985, the
growing fraction of unreimbursed hos-
pital costs can explain the rise in real
hospital care price increases.
2
0 In
1985, 6.4 percent of hospital costs
were not reimbursed. Of this figure,
5.5 percent was due to uncompensated
care and 0.6 percent to Medicare and
Medicaid. By 1989, unreimbursed ex-
penses had risen to 11.2 percent of total
costs, with 6 percent due to uncompen-
sated care and 5 percent to government
payers.
Figure 3 suggests that uncompensated
care has traditionally been an important
factor in the price of health care. Real
medical care price increases have
tended to move with the overall unem-
ployment rate. Since higher unemploy-
ment translates into more uncompen-
sated care, it also leads to higher health
care prices.
• Conclusion
The history of America's health care de-
livery system reveals that many of its
attributes are traceable to the subsidies
provided by employer-based benefits
and government insurance programs
such as Medicare and Medicaid. These
programs have in turn contributed to the
relentless ascent in health care spending
over the postwar period and ultimately to
a series of unsuccessful attempts by the
government to control costs.
To help reverse these trends, several
changes could be made at the federal
level. First, Congress could reconsider
the tax incentives for employer-provided
health care. Second, government health
insurance programs could be designed to
enable us to move away from experience
ratings toward a community-rated sys-
tem. Various subsidy programs, including
vouchers, could be used to offset the cost
of purchasing private insurance.
Although community ratings have been
touted as both more efficient and more
equitable than experience ratings, many
argue that a return to the old system
would be inefficient because of adverse
selection. However, their objection ig-
nores the 43 percent of government-
directed health care spending that could
be used to enhance the functioning of
the private sector.
Today, the federal and state govern-
ments administer three major medical
insurance systems — Medicaid, Medi-
care, and Veterans Affairs. Programs
such as Medicaid that insure otherwise
healthy individuals could be replaced
with a system that instead subsidizes or
purchases private coverage on their be-
half. This would once again return the
able-bodied to the larger community of
those seeking to purchase health insur-
ance. By enlarging this pool, the func-
tioning of the private sector would be
enhanced and the effects of adverse se-
lection mitigated. This would enable a
return to community ratings, which
could be accomplished most simply
through legislation prohibiting insur-
ance companies from discriminating on
the basis of a person's current health
status or other health-related factors.
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